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Catholic Medical Decision-Making
On the Concept of Futility
The understanding that some disease states were incurable and beyond
effective therapy was originally propounded by Hippocrates who in his
writings I advised his contemporaries to decline "to treat those who are
overmastered by their disease realizing that in such cases medicine is
powerless." As a result of continuing medical progress there is the
realization that some diseases, which "overmastered" patients in the past,
are now treatable and even curable. The dramatic achievements of modem
medicine have lent an aura of onmipotence and hubris to therapeutics,
which have given rise to a concept of "futility" in the vernacular of
bioethics. This acknowledges the capacity of modern medicine to extend a
kind of "survival" to patients who are beyond effective therapy. The
realization that some life support actually comprises the prolongation of
the dying process has led various medical organizations to attempt to
define and circumscribe "futility" both as a theoretical concept and as a
basis for bedside decision-making. Although there appears to be an
intuitive consensus among bioethicists that there is a conceptual reality of
the term "futility", there is, at the time a widespread conviction that its
definition is ephemeral and lacking in universal application. 2
The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs in its
comprehensive report on Medical Futility in End of Life Care] concluded,
"Since definitions of futile care are value-laden, universal consensus on
futile care is unlikely to be achieved." In clinical practice, controversy
arises when the patient or proxy and the physician have discrepant values
or goals of care. Typically, futility may be claimed when one party (e.g. the
patient or proxy) wants to pursue the goal of preserving life in the absence
of any hope of future improvement while the adversarial party sees dying
as inevitable and wishes to define futility in terms that prescind from
personal value judgments. Schneiderman, for example, has suggested that
an intervention that is effective in less than 1% of cases should be
considered futile. 6 The problem with using physiological criteria as the
basis for futility is fraught with problems, however. The controversy in the
so-called Baby Doe cases, for example, was based on the notion that
preservmg functions in otherwise impaired patients such as Down
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syndrome infants could be contraindicated. Similarly, debates regarding
the usefulness of neonatal intensive care of very low birth rate infants are
often based not on survival rates alone but rather by an outcome of "intact
survivors." An intervention in such cases may be judged as "futile" if the
survival of the infant carries the risk of handicaps, which are considered
inimical to a certain quality of life.
The resolution of disagreements about futility should preferably be
based on what is in the best interest of the patient. Introduction of a desire
to conserve limited resources of an institution or the society at-large may
be of importance to health care planners or public health authorities but
should not be introduced as the trump card in individual cases.

The Definition of Futility
The difficulty if not the impossibility of defining futility is derivative
of the fact that such a definition would inevitably be subjective rather than
objective. Judgments as to the effectiveness, value and purpose of medical
treatment will unavoidably be based on value judgments regarding medical
effectiveness. In addition, however, the intensity of the personal
relationship of near relatives and surrogates to the patient at issue enters
the equation. Attempts have been made to resolve controversies by
decisions to pursue only the goal of comfort care. The physician in such a
conflict situation provides life support in spite of his conviction that the
only expectation is the prolonging of the dying process. It is also possible
that the roles might be reversed; that is that the proxy may believe that the
physician is inappropriately pursuing life prolongation when death is
inevitable.
Conflicts regarding the appropriate intervention in a particular case
may be further exacerbated by disagreements over which party has the
decision-making authority. Such disagreements are best reconciled within
the health care facility but in extreme cases may be referred to the courts
for adjudication. Such precedents as exist in cases of irreconcilable
disagreement as to which decision maker prevails are themselves
conflicted.
One well-known case is that of Helga Wanglie in which a hospital
went to court to seek permission to discontinue treatment they had judged
to be inappropriate. 4 The patient's husband however, successfully asserted
that his substituted judgment should take precedence over the hospital's
view that intervention was not beneficial. The outcome of the Wanglie case
indicates a hierarchy of authority in medical decision-making in which the
decision of the patient or health care proxy takes precedence over
presumed expertise of the health care team.
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On the other hand, the ruling in Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General
Hospital upheld the prerogative of the attending physician to decline to
carry out intervention he judged to be futile. s The ambivalence of the
courts in these two cases reinforces the preferential option of resolving
conflicts without recourse to the courts. This institutional option is best
served by an existing hospital policy on futility, which can be the basis for
negotiation of impasses. Such policies also help to reduce public criticism
of what can be seen as a paternalistic attempt by professionals to impose
standards on patients.
One standard for judging an intervention to be futile would be that it
has the intention of prolonging dying.
The principles proposed by O'Donnell s are relevant in this context.
While the Catholic Church affirms the dignity of every human life, the
Church also affirms faith in the resurrection, which enables Catholic
tradition to accept death as the inevitable end to temporal life and a
gateway to eternal life. It is for this reason that there is no obligation to
utilize all possible remedies and all possible means of prolonging life.
Since biological life is not an absolute value, death need not be avoided at
all costs. Suicide, assisted suicide and euthanasia are opposed because they
are intrinsically opposed to a reverence for life. Compassion and care for
the dying must never include the willingness to assist in direct killing nor
does it obligate to preserve biological life at all costs. It is not suicide or
euthanasia to choose not to use or to bring to an end useless or
disproportionately burdensome (ethically extraordinary) medical
treatments, procedures or interventions. There is no "right to die" except as
an inherent human right to be free from inappropriate interferences with
one's dying process.
The final decision as to whether to withhold or withdraw medical
treatment must not be an occasion for neglecting the patient. All normal
care such as bed rest, hygiene, pain medication comfort and, most
specifically, food and drink must be provided. As defined by John Paul IP
this includes assisted nutrition in the category of ordinary care. The
proposal that a community or locale might determine its own standards for
what interventions will be provided carries particular risks for the Catholic
community. The much discussed Oregon plan for allocating Medicare
funds seeks to reflect community values in allocating Medicare funds. This
system ranks various health care goals with the ultimate goal of rationing
or, at least p110ritizing health care resources. Futility-based arguments may
have the same goals without making them explicit. Statistically, the
number of cases involving futility debate has not been demonstrated to
constitute a sufficient number of cases to challenge the availability of
scarce resources or to be an effective strategy for conserving such
resources on a community-wide scale.
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Highly publicized cases such as Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan and
Terry Schiavo illustrate how Catholic views on the care of individuals in a
persistent vegetative state could generate conflict between so-called
community consensus and Catholic moral teachings.
Both the Hastings Center Guidelines JO and the Consensus Report of
the Society for Critical Care Medicine ll propose policies, which would be
questionable for Catholic health care institutions. It would be incumbent
on Catholic communities such as sponsorship groups to develop
independent guidelines, which might be swallowed up in so-called
community consensus groups.

Process for Resolution of "Futility" Cases
1) Deliberation and Dialogue. Any policy for resolution of impasse would
presuppose an open discussion between patients, proxies and physicians.
Prognosis should be honestly and openly revealed and based on outcomes
date whenever possible. Arriving at a joint position as early as possible in
the progression of serious or fatal diseases so that goals for mutual
understanding can precede inflexible partisanship.
2) Consultants and patient advocates should be invited into the process by
mutual consent. Such "third parties" can frequently facilitate the
discussion and give it a balance particularly where proxies may feel
victimized by the system.
3) Ethics committees, which are already in place, should be consulted so
that there is an aura of pursuit of standing policy rather than ad hoc
assertion of prerogatives.
4) If the differences remain irreconcilable after a process of negotiation
which both sides consider to have been impartial by professional
standards,2 arrangement for transfer to another institution may be sought.
This can be a wholly unsatisfactory resolution since the ethical dilemma is
not "solved" by moving it to another location.
S) In the not unlikely possibility that no alternative institution can be
found, neither the physician nor the patient can be compelled to violate
strongly held principles or ethical standards. Recourse to legal adjudication
may be the only alternative albeit an undesirable and unsatisfactory
conclusion as mentioned, legal precedents hold no guarantee as to how the
comts will decide. Either the patient's autonomy or the physician's
adherence to personal medical ethics and professional standards will be at
risk in an outcome of legal adversarial decision-making.
6) The intrusion of the state into the process such as in the passage of the
Texas Advance Directives Acs of 1999 13 would seem to have exacerbated
rather than improved the issue as well as the frequency of resort to
litigiousness and dissatisfaction with outcomes. l4
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